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How Many Times Was Lochner-Era
Substantive Due Process
Effective?
by Michael J. Phillips"
I.

INTRODUCTION

According to Justice David Souter, it is "most familiar history" that
back when the Supreme Court took a restricted view of the commerce
power, it also "routinely invalidated state social and economic legislation
under an expansive conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process."' As the word "routinely" suggests, Souter evidently
believed that this Lochner Court2 struck down a large number of laws
on substantive due process grounds' during the years 1897 to 1937."
* Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business. Johns Hopkins
University (B.A., 1968); Columbia University School of Law (J.D., 1973); National Law
Center, George Washington University (LL.M., 1975; S.J.D., 1981).
I would like to thank James W. Ely, Jr. for his helpful comments on an earlier version
of this Article.
1. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1652 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
2. The reference, of course, is to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the
Court used due process to strike down a maximum hours law for bakery employees. This
Article uses the terms "Lochner Court" and "old Court" to refer to the Supreme Court
during the period 1897-1937 inclusive.
3. In this Article, substantive due process means the courts' use of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses to assess the substance of government
action. This definition incorporates both the modern Court's privacy cases and a variety
of little known contemporary substantive due process decisions involving fairly lax review.
On the latter, see Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of Substantive Due
Process,21 RUTGERS L.J. 537, 549-77 (1990). The definition also is broad enough to include
all the Lochner-erasubstantive due process cases, which typically involved deprivations of
property, freedom of contract, or some other liberty. Finally, the definition even includes
situations when other constitutional provisions are incorporated into due process or when
the applicable "due process" standards evidently borrow from some other constitutional
provision. Throughout this Article, I will distinguish situations of this last kind from
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As discussed later, other observers agree. Although they recognize that
the old Court rejected more substantive due process attacks than it
accepted, they also suggest that cases of the latter kind numbered
approximately 200. This means that during the forty years comprising
the Lochner era, the Court used substantive due process to strike down
government action an average of about five times a year.
The question of economic substantive due process's impact has
intrinsic historical interest.5 Because the Court seems to be slowly

"central" or "core" applications of substantive due process. In "core" applications of
substantive due process, the values promoted spring from due process itself.
In either its broad or its narrow signification, substantive due process involves
substantive review of the challenged provision. During the Lochner era, this sometimes
was accomplished through some more or less articulated criterion, such as a means-ends
test or the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard. On occasion, though, the old Court
would simply declare the challenged law unconstitutional because it collided with some
favored right. Contrary to popular belief, however, that favored right was not always, or
even usually, freedom of contract. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
4. In this Article, these years comprise the "Lochner era." The Court's decision in
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), is widely viewed as the first unequivocal sign
of economic substantive due process's emergence. E.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 438 (12th ed. 1991). OnAllgeyer, see infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), is almost universally regarded as signalling
the doctrine's slide into insignificance. E.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 127 (paperback ed. 1992);
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Processand the Supreme Court: An Exhumationand
Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 36-37.
Of course, other candidates for the opening and closing years of the Lochner era exist.
For the former, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), an
early railroad rate regulation case, may be a plausible alternative to Allgeyer. See infra
note 6. Another plausible alternative to Allgeyer is Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887),
in which the Court explicitly invoked substantive due process while upholding a state
regulation. See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra, at 438 (describing Mugler). Economic substantive
due process's virtual demise might be better marked by Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), than by West Coast Hotel. Hope is widely regarded
as putting an end to aggressive Supreme Court review of utility rate regulation. E.g.,
RICHARD J. PIERCE & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 98-99
(1994) [hereinafter PIERCE & GELLHORN]. On the old Court's rate regulation cases, see
infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
5. Scholarly attention to the Lochner Court has increased appreciably over the past 15
or so years. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING
A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 chs. 3-4 (1995); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF Lochner ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993);
PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF Lochner v. New
York (1990); EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS chs. 5-6 (1996); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); Barry Cushman, DoctrinalSynergiesand Liberal
Dilemmas: The Case ofthe Yellow-Dog Contract, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 235; Barry Cushman,
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reviving the doctrine,6 the question is assuming greater practical

Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
PoliticalEconomy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988); James L.
Kainen, The HistoricalFrameworkfor Reviving ConstitutionalProtectionfor Propertyand
Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (1993); Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's
Shadow: Toward A CoherentJurisprudenceof Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329 (1995);
Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV.
265 (1987); Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Court, 4 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 405 (1996) [hereinafter cited as Phillips II]; Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era
Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991);
Stephen A. Siegel, Understandingthe Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over
Railroadand Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Siegel
III; Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process
Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1363 (1990).
6. From the late 1930s until at least the early 1950s, the Court may really have
eschewed any substantive due process review of economic regulations. Beginning early in
the 1950s, however, it reintroduced means-ends analysis when considering due process
challenges to the substance of economic regulation. By the 1980s, the Court began to
admit that such cases involve substantive due process review. See Phillips, supra note 3,
at 544-46 and the cases cited there.
Needless to say, this modern substantive due process review has been very lenient.
Thus, it might be safe to say that prior to 1996, the Supreme Court had not struck down
an economic regulation on substantive due process grounds since its decision in Morehead
v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating a minimum wage law for
women). All this may have changed, however, with the Court's recent 5-4 decision in BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996), when it struck down a $2,000,000
Alabama punitive damages award on due process grounds. Although Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court did not use the terms procedural due process or substantive due
process, at first glance he seemed to ground his decision in a notion associated with the
former: the absence of fair notice about the penalties accompanying one's behavior. Id. at
1598. But the three "guideposts" under which the Court supposedly determined that BMW
had not received adequate notice seem to be substantive criteria. These were the following:
(1) the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct, (2) the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered by the claimant and the size of the punitive damages award, and
(3) the size of that award when compared with state civil penalties in comparable cases.
Id. at 1598-99; see id. at 1599-1603.
Except perhaps for the third guidepost, the Court did not really say how Alabama's
failure to meet these criteria constituted a failure to notify BMW that it could be hit with
a $2,000,000 punitive damages award under the circumstances of the case. It also did not
detail the ways in which Alabama punitive damages law failed to provide such notice.
Furthermore, the Court did not consider a question that bears on the classification of Gore
as applying procedural or substantive due process. Suppose, by statute or otherwise,
Alabama had notified BMW that it could expect a $2,000,000 punitive damages award if
it behaved as it subsequently did. In that event, application of the Court's guideposts
might well dictate the same result even though notice obviously would have been present.
The two dissents in Gore each characterized the majority opinion as an application of
substantive due process. E.g., id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer's concurrence lends some support to this characterization.
Unlike Stevens, Breyer explored the asserted procedural deficiencies of Alabama punitive
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importance as well. The prospect of a new economic substantive due
process naturally awakens traditional criticisms of the Lochner Court.
But some of these criticisms assume that the doctrine had a strong
impact.
The first and perhaps the most formidable of these attacks is that
because the original meaning of due process was procedural, substantive
due process is illegitimate.7 The usual justification for this positivistic
argument is that when courts broadly interpret vague provisions like
due process to strike down legislation, they offend democratic values.'
But the less often economic substantive due process was used in this
way, the less vulnerable it is to charges of judicial legislation.
Another common criticism of Lochner-era substantive due process is
that it unjustifiably benefitted business interests. For example, many
people say that the doctrine's practical effect was to knock out progressive social legislation designed to protect workers against the hazards of
industrialization and their employers' superior bargaining power.? The
damages law. See id. at 1605-09 (Breyer, J., concurring). According to Breyer, the
vagueness of these standards, while not itself a violation of due process, "invite[s] the kind
of scrutiny the Court has given the particular verdict before us." Id. at 1605 (Alabama's
lack of constraining standards warrants Court's detailed examination of the award). And
in Stevens's opinion (which Breyer joined), that review was largely substantive.
In his concurrence, Breyer also stressed the need for judicial review of punitive damages
awards. Id. at 1605. The same emphasis on judicial review of government action was
present in an 1890 decision that some regard as a critical stepping-stone to Lochner-era
substantive due process. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986 41-44 (1990); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 102-03 (Phoenix paperback ed. 1967); James

W. Ely, Jr., The Railroad Question Revisited: Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v.
Minnesota and ConstitutionalLimits on State Regulations, 12 GREAT PLAINS Q. 121, 122
(1992). In Chicago, Milwaukee, 134 U.S. at 456-58, the Court held that a statute giving
a state commission the final authority to determine railroad rates deprived the railroad of
due process by denying it judicial review to determine the reasonableness of those rates.
Technically, this was procedure rather than substance. But in determining the reasonableness of the rate, the state court would have to apply substantive standards. And if it
applied them wrongly, might not higher courts, including perhaps the United States
Supreme Court itself, be required to correct the error? The same, of course, might be true
if the state courts fail in the task Breyer assigned them. For an extended account of the
Chicago, Milwaukee case, its background, and its implications, see Ely,.supra, at 121-31.
7. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 31-32 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 14-21 (1980).
8. See, e.g., BORW, supra note 7, at 139-41, 153-55.

9. "[Jludicial interpretations of the constitutional guarantees of individual liberty
during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries were major obstructions to the
adaptation of law to the needs of the weaker segments of the community in an urban and
industrial society."

ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 134 (1987).

"Lochner'sdownfall did not represent a denigration of economic liberties but a recognition
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fewer times economic substantive due process had these consequences,
one would think, the less valid is this particular charge.
A further, somewhat less common, attack on the Lochner Court builds
on the previous argument. Not only did economic substantive due
process have the effect of assisting business, this argument runs, but it
was consciously intended to have that effect."0

In other words, the

doctrine resulted less from the old Court's belief in laissez-faire than
from its desire to perpetuate business power. But if the Lochner Court
struck down relatively few laws on substantive due process grounds, one
must wonder about its commitment to business hegemony.
This Article's main aim is to determine the number of times the
Supreme Court used substantive due process to invalidate government
action during the years 1897 to 1937 inclusive. Of course, this is an
incomplete measure of the doctrine's impact. A fuller assessment would

include the number of successful substantive due process challenges in
the lower federal courts and the state courts and, more importantly, the
ratio of successful to unsuccessful claims in all relevant forums." An
even fuller analysis would try to consider decisions whose impact is
disproportionate to their numbers. One reason for this Article's limited
scope is that the latter undertakings obviously are difficult ones.
Another is that, as far as I can tell, this Article's relatively modest task
has not been adequately accomplished. Despite the reams that have
been written on the Lochner era, no one has clearly demonstrated how
many times the Supreme Court invalidated government action on
substantive due process grounds throughout the full period from the

that such liberties were not meaningfully protected by the 'free' market, at least for those
who were more its victims than its masters." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1374 (2d ed. 1988).

10. Cox, supra note 9, at 135 (Lochnerian decisions "flowed partly from the willful
defense of wealth and power"); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE:
PRiVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 45-46 (1976) (Lochner Court

Justices knowingly and willingly advanced business interests). For composite statements
of this view and some further sources expressing it, see, for example, GILLMAN, supra note
5, at 3-4; Mary Cornelia Porter, That Commerce Shall Be Free, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 135,
138-40.
11. For a few such attempts covering various portions of the Lochner era, see infranote
12.

1054

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

1890s until the late 1930s.12 Or if anyone has done so, that achievement has not gained much notoriety.
The Article opens by briefly sketching some problems with contemporary accounts ofLochner-era substantive due process and with contemporary estimates of its impact. Then it examines in detail one plausible
source of the recurrent assertion that economic substantive due process
claimed some 200 victims in the Supreme Court. Depending on how one
classifies certain groups of Lochner-era due process decisions, the
doctrine's real Supreme Court body count is much lower. And even if
the term substantive due process is construed broadly, that count still
is well below 200. On either reading, moreover, the relevant decisions
do not always conform to the dominant stereotypes about old-time
economic substantive due process. Nor do they support familiar
stereotypes about certain members of the Court; as discussed later, even
Justice Holmes often wrote or voted to invalidate laws on substantive
due process grounds. Following these discussions, the Article briefly
develops the implications of its findings for some standard criticisms of

12.

Perhaps the principal effort to do so, WRIGHT, supra note 6, at ch. 8, is discussed

later in this Article. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. Another effort to gauge
the impact of economic substantive due process does not cover the whole period. See, e.g.,
2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 741 (rev. ed. 1926) (of the
422 state police measures challenged before the Supreme Court on due process or equal
protection grounds between 1889 and 1918 inclusive, only 53 held the challenged regulation
unconstitutional and only 14 involved legislation affecting the general rights of
individuals). See also Charles Warren, The Progressivenessof the United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 294, 294-95 (1913) (of the 560 cases arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses from 1887 to 1911 inclusive, only
three struck down social and economic regulation). Presumably, different criteria helped
establish the base of Fourteenth Amendment decisions in each of Warren's studies.
Warren's compilations, however, did not include the 1920s, a decade that saw a marked
increase in the number of laws invalidated on substantive due process grounds. In a 1927
study limited to due process cases, Ray Brown concluded that: (1) during the period 18681912 the Supreme Court had struck down six of 98 laws challenged on due process
grounds, (2) during the period 1913-1920 it had struck down seven of 97 such laws, and (3)
during the period 1921-27 it had invalidated 15 of 53 laws subjected to a due process
attack. Ray A. Brown, Due ProcessofLaw, PolicePower, and the Supreme Court,40 HARV.
L. REV. 943, 944-45 (1927). However, Brown limited himself to police power cases, and did
not consider the procedure, tax, jurisdiction, and utility regulation cases considered later
in this Article. Id. at 944 n.7. He also includes in his list of cases invalidating police
power regulation a decision in which the Supreme Court merely returned a case to a lower
court without mentioning the word due process. Id. at 944 n.10. See Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 546-48 (1924) (overturning a lower court decision that had rejected
a Fifth Amendment challenge to a District of Columbia rent control law and returning the
case to the lower court). I do not include Chastleton in the list of substantive due process
invalidations I develop later in the Article.
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Lochner-era substantive due process. Overall, the findings blunt those
criticisms to some degree.

II. THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF LOCHNER-ERA SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
Contemporary discussions of Lochner-era substantive due process3
generally discuss or cite only twenty or so well-known decisions.
Heading the list is Lochner v. New York itself, 4 in which the Court
struck down a New York maximum-hours law for bakery employees.1 5
Prominent in most accounts, moreover, are some other famous employment cases. These include the old Court's controversial decisions in
Adair v. United States," Coppage v. Kansas,'" and Adkins v. Children's Hospital.'" Also typically included are two or three equally
famous decisions in which the Court upheld maximum-hours laws."9
Two other regularly discussed cases are the decisions widely regarded
as initiating and closing the Lochner era: Allgeyer v. Louisiana0 and
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.2 Another frequently included decision is
the Court's 1877 decision in Munn v. Illinois," which established that
states have considerable latitude to regulate businesses "affected with
a public interest."" Sometimes, our standard sources go on to discuss

13. See GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 437-39, 444-57; ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 100-13 (2d ed. 1994); JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA,

& J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 340-50 (3d ed. 1986); SIEGAN, supra note 5, at
110-55; TRIBE, supra note 9, §§ 8-2 to -7 at 567-86. See also Phillips, supra note 5, at 27082 (where I made the same error). Discussing a wider range of cases, however, is KEYNES,
supra note 5, chs. 5-6.
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. Id.
16. 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a federal law forbidding the firing of railroad
workers for their union affiliation).
17. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a state law that forbade employment contracts
conditioning an employee's employment on his not becoming or remaining a member of a
labor union).
18. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia minimum wage law for,
inter alia,women), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
19. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a state maximum-hours law
for women); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding a state maximum-hours law
for factory workers, without mentioning Lochner). See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898) (upholding a state maximum-hours law for workers in underground mines).
20. 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (invalidating a state law that imposed a fine for taking any act
to effect marine insurance on in-state property with any insurer not complying with state

law).
21. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law for women).
22. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
23. Id. at 133-35.
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one or more of several lesser-known decisions exploring what might be
called Munn's negative implication: that states have limited freedom to
regulate businesses not affected with a public interest.24 Usually they
also discuss Nebbia v. New York, 2" the case in which the affected-witha-public-interest doctrine met its demise. Also occasionally discussed are
two 1920s decisions striking down state laws regulating the weights at
which loaves of bread could be sold26 and forbidding the use of "shoddy"
in beds, pillows, upholstered furniture, and the like. 7 Much more
prominent are two "personal rights" decisions that provided some
authority for the modern constitutional right of privacy: Meyer v.
Nebraska' and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.29 Sometimes getting a
brief mention, finally, are some old Court decisions striking down
restrictions on entry to a business, trade, or occupation.3 0
To some of our standard sources, however, these twenty or so cases
evidently are the tip of a much larger iceberg. Those sources seem to
say that the old Court invalidated approximately 200 state and federal
laws on substantive due process grounds.3 ' The sources also do nothing

24. See, e.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (striking down a state law
regulating the price at which theater tickets could be resold); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S.
350 (1928) (striking down a state law regulating the fees an employment agency could
charge); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1928) (striking down a state law fixing
the price at which gasoline could be sold). See also Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), which contains Chief Justice Taft's attempt to define
the term "business affected with a public interest."
25. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a state law authorizing the fixing of milk prices by
a state agency).
26. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
27. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926). Shoddy includes various fabrics
that are cut up, ground up, torn up, or broken up. Id. at 409.
28. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state law forbidding the teaching of any
subject to any person in any language other than English and also forbidding the teaching
of any language other than English as a language until after the eighth grade).
29. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state law requiring that all children between
the ages of eight and 16 attend a public school).
30. The best-known such decisions are New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
(1932) and Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
31. "[E]ven during the Lochner era, while nearly 200 regulations were struck down,
most challenged laws withstood attack." GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 445 (discussing
Lochner-era substantive due process). "It has been estimated that the Supreme Court
invalidated state or federal regulations pursuant to the [D]ue (P]rocess [Cilause, usually
coupled with another provision such as the [Eiqual [Pirotection [Cilause, in 197 cases
between 1899 and 1937, while an even larger number of regulations survived scrutiny."
TRIBE, supra note 9, § 8-2 at 567 n.2 (also discussing Lochner-era substantive due process).
"B.F. Wright has counted some 184 decisions between 1899 and 1937 which invalidated
state laws on the basis of either the due process or equal protection clause .... Those
involving federal laws were far fewer." MCCLOSKEY, supra note 13, at 101 (likewise
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to dispel the natural impression that their 180 or so additional cases
resemble the substantive due process decisions they do discuss. As
authority for their figures, the relevant sources invariably cite Benjamin
Wright's 1942 study entitled The Growth of American Constitutional
Law. 2 At one point, Wright states that "[b]etween 1899 and 1937
there were 212 cases in which state legislation was held to be unconstitutional for failure to preserve the guarantees of the Constitution
regarding the rights of persons. There were 18 such cases involving
Congressional acts."s3 After discussing some "civil rights" cases, Wright
examined decisions involving "the rights of property." Early in the latter
examination, he stated:
Excluding the civil liberties cases, there were 159 decisions under the
due process and equal protection clauses in which state statutes were
held to be unconstitutional, plus 16 in which both the due process and
commerce clauses were involved, plus 9 more involving due process and
some other clause or clauses.34
However, Wright's subsequent discussion does not examine or cite 184
such cases. 35 He does cite a source which lists something like that
number and describes it as a "comprehensive list of cases in which state
action was held contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment through
1938."' s This is Felix Frankfurter's 1938 book, Mr Justice Holmes and
the Supreme Court. In an appendix to that book, Frankfurter provides
a list and individual short descriptions of "Cases Holding State Action
Invalid Under the Fourteenth Amendment" from 1877 through 1938.
37
For the years 1897 to 1937 inclusive, the appendix lists 220 cases.
discussing Lochner-erasubstantive due process). See also PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note
4, at 80 (almost 200 state and federal regulations invalidated by the Court during the 50
years preceding the 1930s, citing Tribe during a discussion of Lochner-era substantive due
process). To be sure, these statements do not specifically say that the 200 or so
invalidations they mention all proceeded on substantive due process grounds. However,
because all of these remarks were made during discussions of Lochner-era substantive due
process, they are most naturally read as referring to cases of that kind.
32. WRIGHT, supra note 6. See GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 444 n.1; TRIBE, supra note
9, at 567 n.2; MCCLOSKEY, supra note 13, at 101.
33. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 148. Wright adds that the 212 figure "does not include

17 cases in which the Court relied upon the commerce and either the due process or the
equal protection clause." Id. n.1.
34. Id. at 154.
35. See id. at 155-79 (combing the text and the notes). Although Wright's exposition
does not facilitate an exact count, this author estimates that Wright cites or mentions

about 120 cases invalidating government action on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
36. Id. at 165 n.63.
37. FELIx FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME CoURT, app. at 97
(1938).
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On the whole, Frankfurter's list is reasonably complete and accurate.38 However, for present purposes, obvious omissions in the list
include seven Lochner-era cases striking down federal action on
substantive due process grounds39 and another case invalidating a
Philippine law under the due process provision contained in the islands'
constitution." The list also did not include four substantive due
process decisions invalidating state action.4 1 On the other hand, four

38. On the completeness question, this author has examined the syllabus for every
Supreme Court case containing the words "due process" for the years 1897 through 1937.
This LEXIS scan suggests that Frankfurter (or his researcher) missed relatively little. For
some relatively minor additions and deletions to the list, see infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.

39. See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton Ry., 295 U.S. 330, 346-61 (1935) (striking
down the compulsory retirement and pension provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act
under a supposed Commerce Clause analysis that actually involved substantive due
process); Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1932) (conclusive
presumption in federal tax statute violates due process); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312,
322-29 (1932) (same); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96100 (1931) (striking down as a confiscatory and arbitrary denial of Fifth Amendment due
process an Interstate Commerce Commission order that exempted certain railroads from
stipulated per diem charges for switching cars from railroad to railroad); Untermyer v.
Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928) (federal gift tax provision violates due process as
applied); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544-62 (1923) (striking down a District
of Columbia minimum wage law for women), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173-80 (1908) (striking down a
federal law that forbade the firing of railroad employees for their union affiliations). On
my inclusion of RailroadRetirement Bd. u. Alton Ry., which is almost universally regarded
as a Commerce Clause decision, see infra note 154.
40. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926), the Court struck down on due
process and equal protection grounds an act of the Philippine legislature making it a crime
to keep business account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or a local
dialect. Id. at 524-27. The law had been challenged by Chinese business people operating
in the Philippines. Id. at 506-07. After stating that the criteria employed in due process
and equal protection under the Philippine Constitution are substantially similar to those
used under their United States counterparts, the Court used several well-known
substantive due process cases of that era to support its decision. Id. at 524-27.
41. See West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 668-80 (1935) (striking
down as confiscatory telephone rates set by state public service commission); West Ohio
Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 80-83 (1935) (striking down as confiscatory
gas rates imposed by a public utilities commission); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v.
Kennedy, 232 U.S. 626, 627 (1914) (striking down a state statute making it easier to
recover for property damaged by operation of a railroad); Duluth & Iron Range R.R. v. St.
Louis County, 179 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1900) (state law amending earlier grant so as to
preserve corporation's obligations to state while taking away consideration therefor denies
equal protection and takes property without due process).
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cases contained in Frankfurter's appendix probably should not have been
included.42
III. A BREAKDOWN OF FRANKFURTER'S LIST
The previous additions and deletions leave us with 228 decisions
invalidating government action on Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
grounds during the years 1897 through 1937. Do these cases substantiate the claim that during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court used
substantive due process to strike down some 200 state and federal laws?
As my previous discussion of Wright's book may have already suggested,
our new list fails to do so. Although these cases invalidated federal or
state action on Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment grounds, many of them
clearly did not use substantive due process to effect the invalidation. Of
the remaining "substantive due process" cases, many arguably do not
deserve that description. To support these claims, the Article discusses
the 228 cases in roughly ascending order of plausible characterization as
substantive due process decisions.
A.

The Equal Protection Cases

One reason why Wright's and Frankfurter's case totals were in the 200
range probably has not escaped some readers. Each source included
cases other than due process cases. Specifically, Wright's initial list
embraced personal rights cases, and Frankfurter's list covered Fourteenth Amendment decisions. With the exception of one Fourteenth
Amendment privileges and immunities decision,43 all of the decisions
not involving due process in Frankfurter's compilation involved equal
protection. Some of these cases conjoined equal protection and some
other basis of decision, but in none of them was that basis clearly due
process. Thirty-three such cases appear on Frankfurter's list.

42. In Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), a suit attacking
municipal telephone rates as confiscatory, the Southern District of California dismissed the
suit on the ground that federal jurisdiction was lacking. See id. at 281-82. While reversing
that dismissal, the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the rates. See
id. at 283-96. In Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 162-64 (1910), which
used the Commerce Clause to strike down a state license tax on foreign corporations, the
Court specifically stated that it was not applying due process or equal protection. Davis
v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 482-85 (1922), was not decided on constitutional grounds.
Finally, I do not read Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 55 (1909), in which the
Court reversed a lower court decision invalidating a state gas rate determination, as clearly
striking down any state action on due process grounds.
43. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 426-33 (1935) (state tax law exempting interest
received from loans of five percent or less made within the state, but not outside it, is
unconstitutional), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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In Frankfurter's one specific reference to his full list, he seemed
hostile to all of the cases it contained." Under contemporary standards, at least, this blanket condemnation is inconsistent with his
progressive reputation. The reason is the nature of some of those cases.
Of the thirty-three listed equal protection decisions, for example, six
invalidated state action discriminating on the basis of race. Today,
perhaps the best-known of these decisions are Nixon v. Herndon,"
which struck down a state statute preventing blacks from voting in a
Democratic primary election,4 6 and Nixon v. Condon,47 which outlawed
the white primary.48 The other four race cases involved the exclusion
of blacks from jury service or grand jury service. 9 To these six race
cases we might add the Court's 1915 decision in Truax v. Raich, °
which struck down an Arizona law commanding that at least eighty
percent of the workers in firms employing more than five workers must
be qualified electors or native-born United States citizens. 51
However, most of the old Court's equal protection decisions striking
down government action-totalling fifteen in all-were tax cases.52
About half of these cases involved favoritism toward local firms, or at
least the differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state businesses."

44. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 37, at 87-88. For example, Frankfurter described the
laws struck down in these cases as involving "matters confessedly of local concern and
derived from local experience." Id. at 87. "Such judicial control of the individualism of the
states," he later added, is both "socially costly" and "often capricious." Id. at 88.
45. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
46. Id. at 540-41.
47. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
48. Id. at 89.
49. Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935) (jury service); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 597-99 (1935) (jury service); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 229-31 (1904)
(grand jury service in a murder case); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1900) (grand
jury service in a criminal prosecution against a black person).
50. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
51. Id. at 39-43.
52. The old Court's substantive due process tax cases are discussed infra at notes 72-81
and accompanying text.
53. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 544-45 (1934) (foreign insurers
taxed at higher assessed values than other firms); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett,
284 U.S. 239, 245-47 (1931) (tax on stock of national banks exceeds tax on stock of state
banks); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1926) (foreign insurance
companies taxed differently than similarly situated domestic insurers); Air-Way Elec.
Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 81-85 (1924) (state corporate franchise tax; both
Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause violated); Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt,
256 U.S. 421, 423-26 (1921) (statute reducing license tax if at least three-quarters of
manufacturer's assets invested in state's property or securities; both Equal Protection
Clause and Commerce Clause violated); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 41417 (1920) (statute not taxing out-of-state income of local corporations without any local
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The other half involved tax classifications deemed discriminatory for
various other reasons." Almost as numerous as the fifteen tax cases
were a heterogeneous group of eleven equal protection decisions
invalidating economic regulations broadly conceived.55 With only a few

business, but taxing such income when earned by other local corporations);Southern Ry.
v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400,411-18 (1910) (franchise tax applies to foreign corporations but not
to domestic corporations doing same business).
54. Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280, 291, 293-95 (1936) (state succession tax); Valentine
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32, 33 (1936) (graduated state tax on gross receipts
of chain stores); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 555-60 (1935) (sales tax on
retailers graduated according to gross sales); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision,
284 U.S. 23, 28-30 (1931) (discriminatory assessments); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1928) (gross receipts tax that distinguishes between
corporate taxi businesses and individual or partnership taxi businesses), overruled by
Lehnkausen v.,Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-40 (1928) (tax on recording of mortgages of less than five
years, but not on recording of longer mortgages); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
260 U.S. 441, 445-47 (1923) (discriminatory assessment); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Road
Improvement Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658, 659-61 (1921) (tax assessment that treats railroads
differently from individuals).
55. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 460-63
(1937) (state law permitting mutual fire insurance companies, but not stock fire insurance
companies, to act through their salaried employees); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,
297 U.S. 266, 272-74 (1936) (milk control act allowing dealers without advertised trade
names who were in business before April 10, 1933 to undersell similar dealers who entered
the business later); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 521-25 (1929) (permit
requirements for cooperative cotton gins more lenient than permit requirements for other
gins); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493-97 (1927) (venue statute that treats
foreign corporations differently from domestic corporations); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 549-51 (1923) (state law imposing various
requirements on nonresident corporations, but not nonresident individuals, before each can
sue in-state); McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 81-87 (1916) (statute
making it a criminal offense to pay less for sugar in Louisiana than in another state);
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 59-61 (1915) (law imposes
reciprocal burdens on shipper and carrier while letting shipper recover attorney fees upon
carrier's delinquency, but not vice-versa); Cotting v. Goddard, 183 U.S. 79, 102-12 (1901)
(state stock yard regulations that effectively apply only to Kansas City stock yards); Gulf,
C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154-66 (1897) (law that for claims of $50 or less against
a railroad, plaintiff can recover costs and attorney fees if railroad fails to pay claim within
30 days after presentation of affidavit and if plaintiff then gets a good judgment against
railroad).
Frankfurter's list categorized as equal protection decisions two other cases in which the
Court did not make its basis of decision clear. FRANKFURTER, supra note 37, at 103, 110.
Neither case gives much reason to suggest that this categorization is wrong. See Gast
Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 55, 57-59 (1916) (inequitable
distribution of costs for paving street); ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 145-48 (1908) (huge
criminal penalties for violation of rate setting law made it impracticable to challenge rates).

1062

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

possible exceptions, these twenty-six decisions simply do not involve due
process.5 6
If the old Court's decisions striking down racial discrimination qualify
as substantive due process cases, it is difficult to imagine which
individual rights cases would not qualify Because they usually involve
economic matters, though, it might seem that the tax cases and
especially the regulation cases should be lumped together with our
earlier list of widely recognized Lochner-era economic substantive due
process cases. But the decisions discussed here are equal protection
cases, not substantive due process cases. They involve different
constitutional language and that language implicates different values
than those applied in substantive due process cases. As the Fifth Circuit
observed in 1988, the government violates equal protection only when it
treats similarly situated people differently, but it violates substantive
due process when it treats someone irrationally, even if it treats
everyone that way." One also might argue that the equal protection
cases involving taxation and economic regulations should be treated as
economic substantive due process cases because, like the latter cases,
they often apply something resembling aggressive rational-basis review.
But throughout the Twentieth Century, substantive means-ends review
has been much less controversial in equal protection cases than in
substantive due process cases. People who object to substantive due
process usually accept rational-basis review in the equal protection
context.'
B. ProceduralDue Process and Related Matters
One apparently little-known fact about the Lochner era is that the
Supreme Court did not use the terms "procedural due process" and

56. In McFarland,241 U.S. at 79 and Ellis, 165 U.S. at 151, the case syllabi say that
the bases of decision were equal protection and due process. Frankfurter's book says the
same. FRANKFURTER, supra note 37, at 98, 110. But the opinions in these two cases do not
clearly indicate that they were decided on due process grounds. See McFarland,241 U.S.
at 87 (where Holmes's opinion finally descends from abstraction to make a specific
reference to equal protection); Ellis, 165 U.S. at 154-66 (which I construe as containing
equal protection reasoning). See also the last two cases discussed in the final paragraph
of the preceding note.
57. Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988).
58. To Robert Bork, for example, substantive due process of any kind is anathema. See,
e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 42-49, 95-100, 110-26. For example, he criticizes Holmes's

famous Lochner dissent because it allowed that Fourteenth Amendment due process has
some substantive content. See id. at 45-46. But Bork seems to embrace a substantive test
of rationality or reasonableness in equal protection cases. See id. at 330.
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"substantive due process" during most, if not all, of that era. 9 Even so,
some thirty-five cases on Frankfurter's list involve procedural due
process or cognate subjects. In most of them, the norms the Court
applied were the basic due process requirements of adequate notice and
a fair trial or hearing, or standards derived from them."° Also implicat-

59. Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Processand the Right of Livelihood,
82 KY. L.J. 397, 406-07 (1993-94) (no member of the Court used "procedural due process"
until 1934 or "substantive due process" until 1948). A LEXIS search for Supreme Court
cases using the term "substantive due process" during the period 1897-1937 yielded no
mention of that term by a member of the Supreme Court.
60. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300-06 (1937) (public
utilities commission order not accompanied by adequate hearing); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936) (murder conviction based on confession produced by torture);
Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 295 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1935) (denial of opportunity to
offer evidence on benefits of an assessment denies street railway company an adequate
hearing); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-97 (1934) (defendant's burden of proving
either citizenship or eligibility for naturalization under California alien land law violates
due process); Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 196-99 (1933) (railroad
commission order invalid because statute which it is based on did not provide for notice,
hearing, or review); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673,678-82 (1930)
(procedures for challenging state tax do not afford claimant adequate hearing); Wuchter
v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 17-24 (1928) (service of process against secretary of state
insufficient notice to party sued because of in-state auto accident); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 522-35 (1927) (state statute empowering mayor to try alleged violators of state
prohibition act violates due process, where mayor had pecuniary and other interests in
conviction); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1926) (notice and opportunity to be
heard required before road district can make assessments against land); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (murder trial in which accused black man hurried to conviction
under influence of mob violates due process); Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1920)
(tax assessment not accompanied by adequate notice or hearing); Ohio Valley Water Co.
v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287,290-91 (1920) (no fair opportunity to appeal water rate
order to judiciary); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331, 336-37 (1920) (no
effective way to challenge rate order where only vehicle is contempt proceedings and severe
penalties for violating order tended to preclude this option); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City
of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 474-76 (1918) (giving conclusive effect to a prior judgment
against one not a party thereto, or in privity with such a party, violates due process);
Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317, 319-20 (1917) (state supreme court violates due process
when it reverses case on basis of a factual proposition ruled immaterial at trial, on which
losing party had no opportunity to offer evidence); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 90-92
(1917) (service upon out-of-state defendant by publication in in-state newspaper provides
insufficient notice); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 422-26 (1915) (no
execution against shareholder when execution against corporation returned unsatisfied and
shareholder afforded no notice or opportunity to be heard); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 380-86 (1908) (inadequate hearing afforded taxpayer and landowner subject to
assessment); Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wricht, 207 U.S. 127, 138-42 (1907) (state's system
of valuing property for tax purposes does not provide adequate opportunity to be heard);
Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 148-60 (1907) (judgment rendered one year after
dismissal of suit against defendant is void, when no subsequent service on defendant); Old
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ing these requirements are several decisions striking down state laws on
vagueness grounds.6 1 Some other cases concern a somewhat distinguishable issue that usually is regarded as procedural: the constitutional
reach of a state's power through its in personam jurisdiction. 2
Although they do not involve jurisdiction, a few other Lochner-era
decisions resemble these jurisdiction cases
in their preoccupation with
63
the extraterritorial reach of state power.

C. IncorporationBroadly Conceived
Since at least 1897, the Supreme Court has held that Fourteenth
Amendment due process prevents the states from taking property
without just compensation."
Five due process decisions decided

Wayne Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15-23 (1907) (due process violated
by giving full faith and credit to judgment, when first state lacked jurisdiction because no
notice); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 407-13 (1900) (five days notice of suit insufficient for
out-of-state defendant on promissory note).
61. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 240-43 (1932) (criminal
provisions of Oklahoma statute forbidding waste of petroleum); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,
274 U.S. 445,453-65 (1927) (criminal provisions of state antitrust law); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-95 (1926) (criminal penalties in state minimum wage law);
American Seeding Mach. Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660, 661 (1915) (state antitrust law);
Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 636-38 (1914) (state antitrust law); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-24 (1914) (state antitrust law). The void-forvagueness doctrine normally is regarded as an application of procedural due process
because vagueness implies inadequate notice, GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 1202; TRIBE,
supra note 9, at 683-84.
62. Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1933) (in-state sale of
goods through a controlled subsidiary insufficient for jurisdiction); Flexner v. Farson, 248
U.S. 289, 292-93 (1919) (service upon defendant's local agent does not afford jurisdiction
when service occurs after agency terminated); Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v.
Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 193-96 (1915) (assertion ofjurisdiction over out-of-state corporation
exceeds limits set by due process); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 129-32 (1915)
(jurisdiction via service on secretary of state fails when cause of action arose outside state,
and foreign corporation had no in-state agent).
63. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-50
(1934) (Mississippi statute invalidating fidelity bond provisions limiting time within which
suit possible does not govern contract made in Tennessee, even though suit took place in
Mississippi); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1930) (Texas statute invalidating
contract provisions that limit time of suit to two years or less violates due process as
applied to out-of-state insurance contract with Mexican insurer); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1924) (Texas statute imposing penalty and allowing
recovery of attorney fees cannot constitutionally be applied against insurance company,
because policy upon which suit is based was made outside the state and therefore is
outside the state's power). For another case that arguably belongs here, see infra note 124.
64. E.g., GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 465; ELY, supra note 6, at 130 (citing Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-41 (1897) (which found no violation
of due process on the facts)).
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between then and 1937 arguably proceeded on the theory that the
challenged state action was an unconstitutional taking of property. The
most notable was Justice Holmes's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon."5 As we will see, the sizable body of Lochner-era utility
regulation cases might also be conceptualized in this way."
Our arguable takings cases did not use the modern term "incorporation," but some of them plainly did include the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause within Fourteenth Amendment due process.67 The
incorporation of other Bill of Rights guarantees within the Fourteenth
Amendment began in earnest during the latter part of the Lochner era.
Of the seven cases in which this occurred, six involved the First
Amendment's application to the states and the other involved the Sixth
Amendment's imposition on them.68
The previous decisions applied to the states constitutional provisions
that formally limit the federal government alone. The Lochner Court
also practiced a different sort of incorporation for a provision that
governs only the states. For various reasons, the Contract Clause had
become a less potent restriction on state economic regulation by the turn

65. 260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922) (state statute forbidding the mining of coal in such a
way as to cause subsidence of the land). See also Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State
Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613,618-23 (1935) (state highway commission order compelling
pipeline company to make changes in its transmission lines without compensation);
Delaware Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193-95 (1928)
(ordinance establishing a hack stand at railroad station violates due process because it is
a taking of railroad's property without just compensation). Cf Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378, 396-404 (1932) (affirming injunction against governor's order limiting oil
production in parts of Texas, perhaps on basis that order is an unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process); Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 156-57 (1913)
(striking down a state's repeal of a statute allowing recovery of consequential damages for
effects of street grading, on apparent theory that by doing so, the state took a statutory
compensation right that had already accrued).
66. See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
67. E.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, at 772 (treating the Takings Clause's application to the
states as an instance of incorporation).
68. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 255-61 (1937) (state anti-insurrection statute
violates First Amendment freedom of speech); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 361-66
(1937) (state criminal syndicalism law, as applied, violates First Amendment freedoms of
speech and assembly); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 242-50 (1936) (heavy
and unusual state tax on certain newspapers violates First Amendment freedom of the
press); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-73 (1932) (Fourteenth Amendment due process
includes Sixth Amendment right to counsel, at least in a capital case); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 707-23 (1931) (state statute making newspapers that regularly engage in
libel public nuisances violates First Amendment freedom of the press); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931) (state statute forbidding display of red flag violates
First Amendment freedom of speech); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927) (state
criminal syndicalism statute violates First Amendment freedom of speech as applied).
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of the century"s9 However, this did not prevent Contract Clause
reasoning from appearing in due process cases. Some six times between
1904 and 1936, the Lochner Court struck down state action on combined
due process-Contract Clause grounds.70 These cases generally argued
that a private agreement or a government grant had been wrongly
impaired by subsequent government action.
All things considered, the eighteen "incorporation" cases just discussed
seem to be peripheral, penumbral, or borderline candidates for inclusion
in our list of Lochner-era economic substantive due process cases. To be
sure, these decisions did use the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause to invalidate substantive government action. But they did so not
on distinctively "substantive due process" grounds, but primarily under
Takings Clause, First Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Contract
Clause rationales. Their application to the states rather than the federal
government aside, that is, the first three kinds of "due process" decisions
resemble normal takings, First Amendment, and Sixth Amendment
decisions, 7 ' and the due process-Contract Clause cases basically look
like normal Contract Clause decisions.

69. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 6, at 7-13. See also ELY, supra note 5, at 110-17
(discussing the Fuller Court's Contract Clause cases).
70. Treigle v. Acme Homstead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 194-98 (1936) (state law changing
building and loan association's obligation to maintain a fund to pay shareholders violates
due process and Contract Clause); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441-48 (1932) (repeal of
state constitutional provision letting creditors and shareholders of corporation recover
against directors for misappropriations by firm's officers violates due process and Contract
Clause as applied to present case); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303,
306-10 (1926) (commission order that railroad provide pass under its tracks and highway
over them and to pay part of resulting cost violates due process and Contract Clause
because it invalidated an earlier ordinance under which city had agreed to pay full cost of
such improvements); Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338, 338-40
(1922) (statute validating illegal collection of canal toll after claimant had recovered for
that toll apparently violates both due process and Contract Clause); Bradley v. Lightcap,
195 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1904) (state statute limiting mortgagee's ability to retain title to
repossessed property both impairs a contract obligation and deprives claimant of property
without due process). Cf. Duluth & Iron Range R.R. v. St. Louis County, 179 U.S. 302,
304-05 (1900) (state law depriving railroad of consideration under an earlier grant, while
not violating Contract Clause due to reserved right to amend, does offend equal protection
and due process).
71. Consider, for example, James W. Ely's remarks on the relationship between the
Takings Clause and substantive due process during the Chief Justiceship of Melville W.
Fuller. After noting how Takings Clause norms shaped the development of substantive due
process, Ely observes that "[t]he Fuller Court analyzed some cases under the due process
framework that today would likely be treated as a takings problem." This failure to
achieve doctrinal precision, Ely continues, plagued later justices as well. ELY, supra note
5, at 104.
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D. The Due Process Tax Cases
Stretching the notion of incorporation to its limit are the Lochner
Court due process decisions in which burden-on-commerce themes
predominate. For example, in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,72 the
Court used both due process and the Commerce Clause to strike down
an Oklahoma statute prohibiting foreign corporations from building
pipelines across highways and using those pipelines to transport natural
gas outside the state." However, most of these seven due process and
burden-on-commerce cases involved state taxation of foreign corporations.'4
Like the more conventional incorporation cases just discussed, the tax
cases decided on due process and Commerce Clause grounds belong at
the periphery of Lochner-era substantive due process. Although they
used due process to strike down substantive government action, they
basically are burden-on-commerce decisions. Also consigned to the
periphery on this reasoning is a decision striking down a state tax on
due process and Contract Clause grounds.75 Another group of tax cases
deserves the "penumbral" label even though they do not involve values
advanced by a specific constitutional provision other than due process.
These are some twenty-three decisions concerned primarily with state
power to tax out-of-state property, income, and activities. 76 As Wright

72. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
73. Id. at 249-62.

74. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 464-67 (1929) (filing fee and license
tax for out-of-state corporations); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S.
203,216-20 (1925) (state excise tax on out-of-state corporations); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S.
66, 67-70 (1920) (tax on out-of-state businesses); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S.
275, 282-86 (1919) (tax on railroad's rolling stock used in state); International Paper Co.
v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135, 142-45 (1918) (excise tax on out-of-state corporations);
Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178, 187-91 (1917) (permit charges and franchise tax on

foreign corporations); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 18-48
(1910) (law conditioning out-of-state corporation's doing business on its paying a charter
fee based on some percentage of its authorized capital).
75. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 595-606 (1931) (application of estate tax to
succession under trust that was created before passage of the tax).
76. Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 161-63 (1933) (tax
on railroad tank cars); First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 321-31 (1932) (succession
tax on in-state corporation owned by resident of another state), overruled by State Tax
Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel.
Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 130-36 (1931) (state income tax based on ratio of in-state tangible
property to all property); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1930)
(inheritance tax on transfer of indebtedness owed to out-of-state decedent by in-state
corporation); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 590-94 (1930) (inheritance tax on in-state
intangibles owned by out-of-state decedent); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280
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observes, these cases concerned "what is essentially one phase of
federalism'--"the relationship between state and state, or perhaps it
would be more accurate to say, between state and property located in
other states."77 Although federalism-related values may not have any
specific constitutional home outside due process, neither do they
resemble the values usually applied in due process cases.
A smaller group of tax cases, however, fit within the core of Lochnerera substantive due process. While striking down state tax laws on due
process grounds, these eleven decisions apply notions of fairness that
spring largely from due process itself. Four of the eleven involved
municipalities or taxing districts that taxed property owners who derived
relatively little benefit from the activity financed by the tax. 8 Another

U.S. 204, 209-13 (1930) (inheritance tax on bonds issued by taxing state; decedent
domiciled, and bonds kept, in another state); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S.
83, 91-94 (1929) (tax on out-of-state trust); Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27, 28-29
(1928) (tax on corpus of trust created and controlled out of state, and owned by people
outside the state) overruled by Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Blodgett v.
Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 18 (1928) (death tax on coins and bank notes that decedent kept in
another state); Southern Ry. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76, 80-84 (1927) (taxation of railroad's
out-of-state intangible property); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567,
575 (1926) (tax on exercise of power of appointment in trust fund created outside state)
overruled by Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v.
Doughton, 270 U.S. 69, 80-84 (1926) (tax on inheritance of stock of foreign corporation
owned by nonresident decedent); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 488-501 (1925) (tax
on transfer of out-of-state. tangible property); Provident Say. Life Assurance Soc'y v.
Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103, 112-16 (1915) (tax on insurance premiums paid by state's
residents to insurer that had ceased to do business in state); Atchison, Topeka, & Santa
Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 285 (1912) (tax on foreign corporation's capital stock);
Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392, 399-409 (1907) (tax on mortgage notes present in state, but
created out of state and backed by out-of-state property); Union Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 201-11 (1905) (tax on corporation's out-of-state rolling stock);
Delaware, Lackawanna, & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, 352-61 (1905) (tax on
corporate stock cannot include portion of stock's value attributable to tangible personal
property located out of state); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 498-503 (1904) (tax on out-ofstate corporate property); Louisville & Jeffersonsville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385,
394-99 (1903) (tax on out-of-state franchise); Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 196-204
(1899) (tax assessment against out-of-state party who owned property in state, for amount
by which liability exceeds sum realized from sale of in-state property). See also Senior v.
Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 429-33 (1935) (state investments tax on income from certificates
entitling holder to portion of rent from real estate, where some of the real estate is within,
state and some not; constitutional basis of decision not clear); Lee v. Osceola & Little River
Rd. Improvement Dist., 268 U.S. 643, 645-46 (1925) (tax on improvements made to land
while it was owned by the federal government).
77. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 160.
78. Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller County Hwy. & Bridge Dist., 277 U.S. 160, 161-63
(1928) (tax assessment by highway and bridge district arbitrary because plaintiff got
relatively little benefit from road for which assessment made); Road Improvement Dist. v.
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was a 1936 decision declaring it arbitrary to use pre-Depression numbers
to value the plaintiff's property 9 Still another seemed to blur substantive due process and equal protection rationales while striking down a
state tax 8on chain stores.8 0 Five more involved various federal tax
measures. 1

E. The "RegulatedIndustries"Cases
With its 1877 decision in Munn v. Illinois, 2 which upheld a state law
regulating the rates charged by grain elevators, the Supreme Court
established the doctrine that businesses "affected with a public interest"
are subject to extensive state regulation.8 3 Included within that
category are businesses such as railroads, electric utilities, gas compa-

nies, street railways, telephone companies, and water companies."4 But
while the states had extensive powers to regulate these businesses, their

Missouri Pac. R.R., 274 U.S. 188, 189-95 (1927) (amount for which railroad assessed for
road parallel to its tracks exceeds benefit railroad derived from that road); Myles Salt Co.
v. Board of Comm'rs., 239 U.S. 478,479-85 (1916) (drainage district's taxation of plaintiffs
land deprives him of property without due process because land did not benefit from
district's activities). Cf Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 275-97 (1898) (municipality's
assessment of costs of condemning property for road on landowner whose land the road
crossed violates principle that land must be specially benefitted by the activity funded by
the assessment; case seems to partly proceed on a takings rationale).
79. Great N. Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 145-53 (1936).
80. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 533-36 (1933) (striking down one portion
of a Florida anti-chain store tax that laid an additional tax on chains with stores in
different counties). See also Road Improvement Dist., 274 U.S. at 194 (containing an equal
protection holding distinct from the substantive due process holding described in supra
note 78).
81. Three of these cases involved certain presumptions created by federal tax law. See
Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352,354-55 (1932); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312,
322-29 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 239-40 (1926). Another held it
unconstitutional to assess against a husband an income tax based on his income plus his
wife's income. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206,214-18 (1931). The last case involved
a federal tax on gifts. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928).
82. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). For descriptions of Munn, of the historical roots of the doctrine,
and of its subsequent evolution, see, for example, Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and
Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV.L. REV. 759 (1930); Walton H. Hamilton,
Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930). The affected-with-a-publicinterest doctrine is usually regarded as having met its demise in Nebbia v.New York, 291
U.S. 502, 531-39 (1934). But see Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 449-51 (1937)
(applying the doctrine while finding the business of tobacco warehousing to be affected with
a public interest).
83. 94 U.S. at 125-36.
84. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 100-01, 155. The definitive statement of the
categories of businesses deemed affected with a public interest occurred in Chas. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534-44 (1923).

1070

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

powers were still subject to constitutional checks. For example, in
Smyth v. Ames,"5 the Court affirmed the judiciary's power to review the
reasonableness of rate decisions by utility regulators, s setting forth
standards that courts followed with greater or lesser fidelity for over
forty years.5 7 The details of the tests in Smyth v. Ames, the challenges
to them, and their subsequent modifications fortunately need not concern
us here."5 What is important is that, Smyth v. Ames included, the

Court struck down state or federal rate regulations on some thirty-nine
occasions between 1897 and 1937 inclusive.

9

During that period, it

85. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). On the Court's early rate regulation cases leading up to and
including Smyth, see, for example, ELY, supra note 5, at 83-89.
86. 169 U.S. at 522-50.
87. The Supreme Court's decision in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944), is widely regarded as ending serious constitutional review of utility
rate regulation. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the
JudiciaryAttempt to Police the Political Institutions?,77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2031-33 (1989).
88. For a detailed discussion of these and other relevant matters, see, for example,
Siegal II, supra note 5, at 215-59.
89. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522-50 (1898) (railroad rates); The Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 433-73 (1913) (railroad rates); The Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474,
507-09 (1913) (railroad rates); San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. County
of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454,458-61 (1914) (water rates); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota
ex rel. McCue, 236 U.S. 585, 595-605 (1915) (railroad rates); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Conley,
236 U.S. 605, 608-14 (1915) (railroad rates); Rowland v. Boyle, 244 U.S. 106, 107-11 (1917)
(railroad rates); City of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 185-94 (1918)
(water rates); Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 434-37 (1919) (street
railway fares); Groesbeck v. Duluth, South Shore & Atl. Ry., 250 U.S. 607, 611-15 (1919)
(railroad rates); Vandalia R.R. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 113, 118-22 (1921) (railroad rates);
Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 174-78 (1922) (gas rates); City of Houston
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318, 321-25 (1922) (telephone rates); City of
Paducah v. Paducah Ry., 261 U.S. 267, 275 (1923) (electric street car fares); Prendergast
v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43, 50-51 (1923) (telephone rates); Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 287-89 (1923) (telephone
rates); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679,
684-95 (1923) (water rates); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403,
405-16 (1924) (gas rates); Ohio Utils. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 359, 362-64
(1925) (gas and electric rates); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Department of Pub. Works, 268 U.S.
39, 42-45 (1925) (railroad rates); Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413, 419-25 (1925)
(street railway fares); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590-92 (1926) (telephone
rates); Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1926)
(telephone rates); Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., 271 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1926) (gas rates);
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 410-21 (1926) (water rates); Ottinger
v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 272 U.S. 579, 580-81 (1926) (gas rates); Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 344, 350-52 (1927) (railroad rates);
Denney v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 276 U.S. 97, 101-04 (1928) (telephone rates); United Rys.
& Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249-54 (1930) (street railway rates); Railroad Conm'n
v. Maxcy, 282 U.S. 249, 250-51 (1931) (water rates); Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 290 U.S. 264,275 (1933) (gas rates); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public
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also invalidated at least fifteen other laws affecting regulated businesses; typically the regulations in question ordered a railroad or a utility to
take some expensive or burdensome action.' On six occasions, finally,
the Court overturned civil recovery or civil remedy provisions aimed at
railroads. 9'

Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 398, 404-14 (1934) (price for natural gas); West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63,67-77 (1935) (gas rates); West v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 668-80 (1935) (telephone rates); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 80-83 (1935) (gas rates). See also Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96-100 (1931) (ICC order regarding charges for switching
cars between railroads); City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co., 255 U.S. 547,
555-58 (1921) (confiscatory nature of rates assumed in decision holding that government
and utility had not made contract on this subject); Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of
Chariton, 255 U.S. 539,542-46 (1921) (same); Lake Shore &Mich. S. Ry. v, Smith, 173 U.S.
684, 691-99 (1899) (statute compelling railroad to sell 1000-mile tickets for a set fee),
overruled by Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917).
90. Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 235-41 (1904) (arbitrary ordinance
forbidding construction of gas works that city previously granted company right to build);
Cleveland Elec. Ry. v. Cleveland, 204 U.S. 116, 142 (1907) (compelled transfer of street
railway's rails, poles, and appliances to another street railway after termination of first
railway's franchise); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143-45
(1909) (constitutional provision compelling railroad to deliver cars to, and accept cars from,
other railroads); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 205-08 (1910) (statute
requiring railroad to build or maintain side track to grain elevators); Washington ex rel.
Oregon R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 527-33 (1912) (order that tracks
of competing railroads be connected at various points); South Covington & Cincinnati St.
Ry. v. City of Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1915) (regulation that temperature of
railroad cars never should fall below fifty degrees); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota, 238 U.S.
340, 345-47 (1915) (order for railroad to install scale at its stockyards); Southwestern Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 489-91 (1915) (court decision striking down statutory
penalty against terminated phone customer); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v.
Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491, 497-502 (1915) (statute requiring that railroad not let down upper
berth in sleeping cars before berth actually sold); Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Mobile &
Ohio R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 393-96 (1917) (order that financially distressed railroad restore
six passenger trains to service); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 251
U.S. 32, 37-40 (1919) (order that electric company remove its poles and property, so that
city could build its own system); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396,
398-400 (1920) (order to operate narrow-gauge railroad at a loss); Great N. Ry. v. Cahill,
253 U.S. 71, 73-77 (1920) (order for railroad to install scales at its stockyard); Chicago, St.
Paul, Milwaukee & Ohio Ry. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162, 166-67 (1930) (order that railroad
install underground pass to connect two portions of farmer's farm); Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 68-81 (1937) (gas proration order limiting wells'
production).
91. St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 358-61 (1912) (statute
giving double liability plus attorney's fees to owner of livestock allegedly killed by railroad,
if railroad refused demand for compensation); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340,
346-51 (1913) (civil liquidated damages provision for violating rate schedule for shipping
petroleum products); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 167-68
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These cases formally proceeded on due process grounds. Yet the basic
rationale for the rate cases was that by depriving regulated industries
of a reasonable return on their property, excessively low rates take that
property without just compensation.92 Indeed, some commentators
class these decisions as Takings Clause cases.9" Some of the cases
striking down regulations other than rate regulations also employed
Takings Clause reasoning.94 Although they did not use the term,
therefore, both classes of cases can be regarded as incorporation
decisions. Like the incorporation cases discussed earlier, both probably
should be regarded as at the periphery of Lochner-era substantive due
process because both apply values that derive from another constitutional provision. However, the six civil recovery and civil remedy cases
tended to involve notions of fairness unique to due process and not
expressed by some other constitutional provision.95 For this reason, I
class them as "core" applications of substantive due process.
Land-Use Regulation

F

Despite the support it gave to zoning through its landmark decision
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.," the Lochner Court struck
down four land-use regulations on due process grounds. Because in each
the main theme was the arbitrariness of the challenged regulation, these
cases qualify as true substantive due process decisions. In one of these

(1914) (same general type of statute at issue in Wynne); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
v. Kennedy, 232 U.S. 626,627 (1914) (following Polt); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider

Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 46-48 (1922) (statute allowing recovery of attorney fees against
carrier upon appeal, under certain circumstances); Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279
U.S. 639, 642-44 (1929) (presumption that railroad liable for injuries resulting from its

operations, unless railroad could prove that it observed reasonable care).
92. E.g., West, 295 U.S. at 671 ("the due process clauses... safeguard private property
against a taking for public use without just compensation," and the "just compensation

assured by these constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon ... [the
property's] value"). See also Smyth, 169 U.S. at 526 (question is "whether ... [the rates]
are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation
as the Constitution secures, and therefore without due process of law"); United Rys. & Elec.
Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249 (1930) (neither utility's property nor use of that property
"constitutionally can be taken for a compulsory price which falls below the measure ofjust

compensation").
93. E.g., Pierce, supra note 87, at 2033. See also ELY, supra note 5, at 104 (remarking
on the confused relationship between the Takings Clause and substantive due process
around the turn of the century).
94. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 205-06, 208(1910); City of
Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 251 U.S. 32, 37, 39-40 (1919).
95. E.g., Polt, 232 U.S. at 168 ("the rudiments of fair play required by the Fourteenth
Amendment are wanting" under the challenged statute).
96.

272 U.S. 365, 386-97 (1926).
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decisions, Nectow v. City of Cambridge,7 the Court applied Euclid to
conclude that a zoning scheme's classification of certain land lacked a
substantial relation to the public safety, health, morals, and welfare."8
In two other cases, however, the arbitrariness of the challenged
measure lay more in its standardless delegation of power to private
parties than in its failure to satisfy means-ends review. One of these
cases, Eubank v. City of Richmond,99 struck down an ordinance
requiring that the city establish a specified building line on a street
whenever two-thirds of the property owners on that street requested
it."° In Washington ex rel. Seattle 71tle Trust Co. v. Roberge,'01 the
Court invalidated an ordinance that, as applied, made the construction
of a home for the aged poor contingent on the consent of two-thirds of
02
the property owners living within 400 feet of this proposed building."
A major theme in both Eubank and Roberge was that the challenged
ordinances effectively gave one group of landowners power over other
owners' use of their land. An owner's ability to dispose of her property
as she wishes also was central in Buchanan v. Warley,0 3 where the
Court struck down an ordinance preventing a black person from moving
to a block in which over half of the property owners were white.'
PriceRegulation
During the Lochner era, as we have seen, businesses affected with a
public interest could be subjected to significant government regulation.
What about businesses that were not so affected? During the 1920s, the
Court asserted that for those businesses, the regulation of prices was
On this basis, it struck down state price-fixing
unconstitutional.'
schemes for the resale of theater tickets, the fees charged by employment
agencies, and the retail sale of gasoline."° Without using the affectedG.

97. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
98. Id. at 187-89.
99.

226 U.S. 137 (1912).

100. Id. at 143-44.
101. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).

102. Id. at 120-23.
103. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
104. Id. at 74-82.
105. "[The power to fix prices ....... ordinarily, does not exist in respect of merely
private property or business, .... but exists only where the business or the property
involved has become 'affected with a public interest.'" Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418, 430 (1927).
106. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239-45 (1929) (retail sale of gasoline);
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 355-59 (1928) (fees charged by employment agencies);
Tyson & Bro., 273 U.S. at 429-45 (resale of theater tickets). See McAllister, supra note 82,

at 775-86; Hamilton, supra note 82, at 1101-04.
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with-a-public-interest doctrine, moreover, the Court also invalidated a
state law forbidding price discrimination between localities in the
purchase of milk products. 0 7 Because they proceeded on the theory
that price regulation is a most serious interference with economic liberty
and therefore requires considerable justification,"° these four cases are
central to Lochner-era substantive due process.
Entry Restrictions and Related Measures
Although the point remains somewhat obscure, a business's classification as private, rather than as affected with a public interest, probably
limited the government's regulatory power in other areas besides price.
A possible example is the Court's 1932 decision in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann,"' which struck down an Oklahoma law limiting entry to
the state's ice industry."0 The other five Lochner Court decisions
invalidating restrictions on entry did not involve the affected-with-apublic-interest doctrine."' Perhaps the best known of these is Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,"2 which invalidated a state statute
basically requiring that every pharmacy or drug store established after
the statute's passage be wholly owned by a licensed pharmacist or
pharmacists."' Of the four other cases striking down entry restrictions, three involved trucking industry regulations that treated private
carriers like common carriers," 4 and one involved a Texas law forbidH.

107. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1927). Earlier versions
of the statute had created liability only when the price discrimination was accompanied by
an anticompetitive purpose, but the law at issue in the case did not contain this
requirement. This evidently was the key to the Court's decision, for it intimated that the
earlier versions would have passed constitutional muster. The apparent basis of the
decision was that the revised law would forbid innumerable contracts that had no
anticompetitive effect or purpose. See id. at 8-9.
108. E.g., Tyson & Bro., 273 U.S. at 430-31. See also Hamilton, supra note 82, at 109192.
109. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). Although technically it considered whether the Oklahoma
ice industry was "charged with a public use." Id. at 273. Liebmann generally is regarded
as a case applying the affected-with-a-public-interest doctrine. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note
6, at 167-68. For an extended discussion of the case and Justice Brandeis's famed dissent
in it, see Phillips II, supra note 5, at 440-47.
110. 285 U.S. at 273-80.
111. On these cases, see Phillips II, supra note 5, at 434-40. But the old Court upheld
many more entry restrictions, most of which were occupational licensing provisions
governing the various professions. See id. at 431-38.
112. 278 U.S. 105 (1928), overruledby North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's
Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
113. Id. at 111-14.
114. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553,561-68 (1931); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S.
583, 591-99 (1926); Michigan Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 576-78 (1925).
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ding a person from acting as a freight train conductor without having
previously served for two years as a conductor or foreman on a freight
train. 115
Although they did not always say so, these entry restriction cases
effectively protected an economic right which the old Court clearly
regarded as central to due process: the right to pursue the trade or
occupation of one's choice." 6 For that reason, and because they
obviously attacked the substance of the laws they struck down, these
cases are within the core of Lochner-era substantive due process. The
same is true of a related decision striking down a law that impeded one's
ability to carry on a business and to compete. This was the Court's 1926
decision in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,17 which negated a Philippine
statute making it a crime to keep business account books in any
language other than English, Spanish, or a local dialect, and which had
been challenged by Chinese businesspeople." s
I.

Other General Economic Regulations

Because it is said to mark the Supreme Court's first use of due process
to invalidate the substance of government action, Allgeyer v. Louisiana"9 often is regarded as opening the Lochner era."' In Allgeyer,
the Court considered a Louisiana statute forbidding, inter alia, any act
to obtain marine insurance on in-state property from any carrier that
had not in all respects complied with Louisiana law.' 2' The defendant
in that case allegedly had violated the statute by writing a New York
insurer concerning 100 bales of cotton that were to be shipped to foreign
ports. 22 But the statute, the Court held, was unconstitutional because
it deprived defendant of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment-specifically, the freedom to contract for insurance outside
the state."2 In the years following Allgeyer, the Court struck down
three other laws of a roughly similar nature. Taken alone, these cases

115. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636-42 (1914).
116. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (due process liberty includes
right of the individual to engage in any of life's common occupations).
117. 271 U.S. 500 (1926). This case was decided under the due process and equal
protection provisions of the Philippine Constitution, provisions the Court regarded as
substantially similar to their United States counterparts. Id. at 524.
118. Id. at 524-27,
119. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
120. E.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, at 567.
121. 165 U.S. at 579.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 589-93; see especially id. at 591.
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are not clearly substantive due process decisions.' 24 Still, their
similarity to Allgeyer arguably justifies their categorization as central to
Lochner-era substantive due process.
Three other decisions involving general economic regulations deserve
the same categorization because they apply some kind of means-ends
review to those regulations. Two of these cases are well-known. In Jay
Burns Baking Co. u. Bryan,125 the Court struck down a state statute
regulating the weights at which loaves of bread could be sold, because
this law was insufficiently well-adapted to the protection of consumers
against short-weight loaves. 26 In Weaver v. Palmer Brothers,12 7 it
invalidated a state law forbidding the use of "shoddy" in mattresses,
pillows, bolsters, feather beds, upholstered furniture, and the like,
because the law could not be defended either as a health measure or as
an antideception provision."2
A less-known decision, Manley v.
Georgia,"2 struck down a state law creating a rebuttable presumption
that bank directors are criminally liable for fraud upon the insolvency
of their bank. It did so because there was too little rational connection
between the presumption and the fact on which it was based." a

124.

In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 367-77 (1918), the Court

considered a Missouri statute forbidding the forfeiture of a life insurance policy for
nonpayment of premiums, valuing the policy, and using this to establish a single premium
for temporary insurance for the amount stated in the policy, and held that the statute
could not constitutionally govern a loan contract apparently made in New York and stating
that it would be governed by New York law. The Court discussed Allgeyer, but decided the
case on the basis of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), which did not
make Frankfurter's list. Head's rationale, moreover, resembles the rationale for the cases
discussed in supra note 63, which involved a state's power to declare rules of decision for
transactions occurring in another state. See 246 U.S. at 375-77 (quoting Head, 234 U.S. at
161). Indeed, this concern may be the real inspiration for Allgeyer itself. CURRiE, supra
note 6, at 46.

Here I also include two Holmes decisions that, despite appearing on the Frankfurter list,
did not clearly employ due process. Like Allgeyer, each struck down a state statute that

arguably disfavored out-of-state insurers. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S.
426, 433-36 (1926) (state law forbidding any insurance company authorized to do business
in the state from paying anyone not so authorized to place insurance on in-state risks); St.
Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 348-49 (1922) (state statute
imposing five percent tax on amounts paid to insure in-state property, where insurer not
registered to do business within the state).
125. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
126. Id. at 513-17.
127. 270 U.S. 402, 412-15 (1926).
128. Id. Shoddy is any material spun into yarn, knit, or woven into fabric; and then
cut up, torn up, broken up, or ground up. Id. at 409.
129. 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
130. Id. at 5-7.
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J.

The Employment Decisions
As Wright observed in 1942, "[wlhile the number of cases in which the
Court has held unconstitutional statutes seeking to ameliorate the
conditions of labor has not been large, these decisions have a significance
out of all proportion to their quantity." 31 Although one might wonder
whether this significance is completely justified, most of the thirteen
cases here regarded as employment-related are very familiar ones. The
most familiar of the group, of course, is Lochner itself. There, the Court
struck down a maximum-hours law for bakery employees, primarily
because that measure did not promote worker health with sufficient
directness.'32
Lochner, it is often said, was overruled sub silentio by the Court's 1917
decision in Bunting v. Oregon.3' But the Court reaffirmed Lochner's
validity six years later in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,'34 when it
struck down a District of Columbia minimum wage law for women. 3 '
Before finally overruling Adkins in 1937,136 the Court followed it in
three subsequent cases. 37
Although Adkins probably was a broader ruling, the Court also struck
down another minimum wage law in 1923. In Chas. Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations,"s it invalidated portions of the
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act empowering that body to fix
wages and other terms of employment within industries declared
affected with a public interest.'3 9 A 1924 follow-up to this case
accepted its holding while refusing to decide whether a provision of the

131. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 172.
132. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905).
133. 243 U.S. 426 (1917). According to David Currie, for example, Bunting "buried
Lochner without even citing it." CURRIE, supra note 6, at 103.
134. 261 U.S. 525, 545-62 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). Regarding Lochner, Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court declared that
while subsequent cases had distinguished it, "the principles therein stated have never been
disapproved." Id. at 550. Nonetheless, Sutherland still felt constrained to distinguish the
minimum wage law at issue in Adkins from maximum hours laws. Id. at 553-54.
135. Id. at 545-62. In Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917), a per curiam decision
by an equally divided Court had affirmed lower court decisions upholding minimum wage
laws.
136. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,400 (1937) (upholding a minimum
wage law for women).
137. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603-18 (1936); Donham v.
West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925).
138. 262 U.S. 522 (1923). This muddy decision for a unanimous Court defies succinct
restatement.
139. Id. at 534-44.
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Kansas act forbidding any union officer from inducing another to violate
4
the act was separable from the provision struck down in Chas. Wolff." 0
A year later, the Court struck down a maximum-hours provision
contained in a writ of mandamus issued by the Kansas Supreme Court
following Chas. Wolff's return to that court.14 1 But it explicitly left
open the question whether such a provision would be constitutional in
a different context. 42
Two Lochner Court decisions involving the implications of union
membership are almost as well known as Lochner and Adkins. In Adair
v. United States,' the Court struck down a federal law that prohibited certain common carriers from firing or otherwise discriminating
against a worker for his union affiliation.' 44 The main basis for this
ruling was that the law unreasonably interfered with freedom of
contract. Relying on Adair, the Court in Coppage v. Kansas45 rejected
a Kansas statute banning "yellow dog" contracts: contracts conditioning
employment on an employee's promise not to join or remain a union
member."4 In another "labor" case, Truax v. Corrigan,47 the Court
considered a state statute restricting the use of injunctions and
restraining orders in labor disputes. The law had been applied to allow
union picketing and handbilling that libelled a restaurant owner and
threatened injury to his customers. This, the Court held, deprived the
owner of property without due process. 4"
Rounding out our list of Lochner Court employment decisions are two
miscellaneous cases. In Adams v. Tanner,49 the Court struck down a
state initiative whose virtual effect was to ban employment agencies. It
did so because the law unduly restricted the liberty to engage in a useful
business. 50 The second case, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railway,'5 ' invalidated the compulsory retirement and pension provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act. 2 The Alton decision usually is
treated as involving Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce

140. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-91 (1924) (returning the case to the state
court for a decision on the separability issue).
141. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552,566-69 (1925).
142. Id. at 569.
143. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
144. Id. at 172-75.
145. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
146. Id. at 8-20.
147. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
148. Id. at 327-30.
149. 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
150. Id. at 593-97.
151. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
152. Id. at 346-61.
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But the case contains little or no traditional Commerce

Clause reasoning and has many passages that strongly resemble
substantive due process."6 4
K

Three "PersonalRights" Cases

The three cases that conclude this summary have a special claim to be
considered central to Lochner-era substantive due process. Not only do
they display the means-ends analysis and the expansive conception of
due process liberty that the doctrine sometimes exhibits, but they
remain influential today. Specifically, they have helped justify the
modern constitutional right of privacy.155 First in this line of cases is
the Court's 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,"s which struck down
a state statute that forbade the teaching of any subject in any language
other than English in any public or private school and the teaching of
any such language as a language to any student who had not completed
the eighth grade. This law, the Court said, infringed a variety of due
process liberties, and did so without a reasonable relation to some
purpose within the legislative competence.'5 7 The second decision in
our trio is Bartels v. Iowa,"' a little-known companion case to Meyer.
In the final case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' the Coirn, rejected a
state law requiring that all children between the ages of eight and
sixteen attend a public school. This measure was unconstitutional
because it restricted the liberty often said to characterize this group of
cases--the freedom of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing

153. E.g., GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 116.
154, Early in his majority opinion, Justice Roberts stated that the commerce power
"must be exercised in subjection to the guarantee of due process of law found in the Fifth
Amendment." 295 U.S. at 347. Then he said that the parties' contending views "open two
fields of inquiry which to some extent overlap." Id. These were: (1) whether Congress has
properly exercised a granted power, and (2) whether such an exercise transcends due
process. Id. at 347 n.5. Much of the majority's subsequent analysis of the act's various
provisions, with its occasional declarations of their arbitrariness, its clear willingness to
second-guess Congress, and its scarcity of anything resembling traditional Commerce
Clause analysis, suggests that the latter concern was foremost in the Justices' minds. See
id. at 348-61. At the conclusion of this discussion, Roberts said that it "sufficiently
indicates our agreement with the holding of the trial court respecting the disregard of due
process exhibited by a number of the provisions of the Act." Id. at 361.
155. E.g., GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 446, 491-92.
156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
157. Id. at 399-403.
158. 262 U.S. 404, 409-11 (1923).
159. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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and education of the children under their control-and did so without
some reasonable relation to a valid state purpose."e
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Of the 228 decisions on my adjusted Frankfurter list, sixty-nine (30%)
simply are not substantive due process cases. This group consists of
thirty-five procedural due process decisions, thirty-three equal protection
decisions, and one privileges-and-immunities case. 161 The biggest
group of decisions within Frankfurter's collection consists of the 104
adjudications (46% of the total) earlier dubbed peripheral, penumbral,
or borderline substantive due process cases. Here, the most numerous
subgroup involves rate regulations for businesses affected with a public
interest (39 decisions), followed by the bulk of the due process tax cases
(32), the "incorporation" decisions (18), and the decisions involving
regulatory orders directed at businesses affected with a public interest
(15).162 Only fifty-five cases (24%) fit within the core of Lochner-era
substantive due process. These include the cases involving: employment
(13 such decisions), miscellaneous general economic regulations (7), entry
restrictions and related measures (7), civil recovery and civil remedies
against railroads (6), land use (4), price regulations (4), and "personal"
rights (3).O This last group also includes eleven of the due process
tax cases." Except for a few well-known decisions upholding regulation,
the cases typically found in modern discussions of Lochner-era substantive due process come from this list of fifty-five.6
The Dilemma
The preceding discussion does not support the claim that Lochner-era
substantive due process was effective on some 200 occasions. Instead,
as Frankfurter's description of his list made clear," the 200 figure
approximates the number of times the old Court struck down state
action on FourteenthAmendment grounds rather than on substantive
due process grounds. Nonetheless, that figure does roughly describe
substantive due process's impact if we add to the fifty-five core
substantive due process cases the 104 decisions previously deemed

A.

160. Id. at 534-35.
161. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 64-77, 82-95 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 96-159 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 37. Similarly, Wright's description of his
compilation extended well beyond due process. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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peripheral. But whatever else might be said for it, this tactic tends to
undermine long-settled views about Lochner-era substantive due process.
By including the peripheral decisions, we render that doctrine considerably less fearsome. By making oldtime substantive due process
quantitatively more significant, in other words, we simultaneously make
it more acceptable to modern sensibilities.
The First and Sixth Amendment incorporation cases illustrate this
dilemma most vividly.167 Virtually no one would reject these decisions
today. Yet if Lochner-era substantive due process is a bad thing, and if
these cases are part of it, maybe that position deserves re-evaluation.
Or does the goodness of these cases mean that there was something good
about the old Court's approach to due process after all? Also illustrating
the dilemma, though perhaps less forcefully, are the due process tax
Because these decisions
cases earlier classified as peripheral.'
appear to have counterparts today," 9 it is difficult to tar them with
the Lochner brush.
At first glance, however, the old Court's many decisions involving
railroads and other businesses affected with a public interest do appear
consistent with the accepted stereotypes. 170 This is particularly true
of the approach taken in the Court's many rate cases, which has not
endured. 7 ' To all appearances, those cases present a classic clash
between wealthy private interests (the utilities, their shareholders, and
their bondholders) and the general public. But judicial review of rate
regulation was motivated at least in part by the fear that legislatures
and regulatory bodies would destroy the value of regulated firms'
The facts of some of the old73
property by setting rates too low.'
Court's rate decisions suggest that this fear may have been justified.

167. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 72.75 and accompanying text.
169. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 441-53.
170. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
171. The Supreme Court's substantive review of utility rate regulation largely ceased
after its decision in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
See supra note 87. On the minimal substantive review that has prevailed since then, see
PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 4, at 98-101.
172. "During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court believed that
serious political malfunctions existed in the utility regulatory process and that the judiciary
was institutionally capable of reducing the harmful effects of those malfunctions with
tolerable error and resource costs." PIERCE, supra note 87, at 2045. See also ELY, supra
note 5, at 88; Siegel II, supra note 5, at 206-09.
173. See, e.g., Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1919)
(municipal ordinance regulating street railway fares is unconstitutional because its
enforcement would result in a deficit to the company; no need to value company's property
under these circumstances).
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Another consideration pushing the Court toward substantive review of
rates was the fear that excessive state regulation would inhibit private
investment in railroads and, thus, their ability to expand and improve
their services."' 4 The approach taken in the old Court's rate cases,
moreover, may have been abandoned less because it was later seen as
illegitimate, than because it could not be effectively implemented.'75
Some of the problems that the rate cases purported to address,
furthermore, remain with us today (as do some of the tests and
principles used in those cases116 ). For example, in a 1989 article on
electric utility regulation, Richard J. Pierce found it
easy to conclude that utility regulation in the 1980s is afflicted by the
political malfunction Madison feared most- majoritarian bias based on
unequal distributions of property. In constitutional law terms, the
inference seems inescapable that, on an aggregate basis, state govern-

ments are 'taking' billions of dollars worth of property through the
regulatory process. 7
As Pierce recognized, however, during the 1950s and 1960s, the same
utilities that later suffered from this "majoritarian bias" benefitted from
the "minoritarian bias" resulting from their influence over then-friendly
state regulators. 7 ' Undoubtedly the same was sometimes true during
the Lochner era, but this does not obviate the problem of majoritarian
bias.
During the Lochner era, moreover, minoritarian bias occasionally
worked to the disadvantage of particular regulated industries. Perhaps
the most blatant example is presented by the Court's 1904 decision in
Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles," 9 which struck down a municipal
ordinance that contradicted an earlier ordinance by forbidding the

174. See Ely, supra note 4, at 125, 129-30; Porter, supra note 10, at 143.

175. "Although other factors undoubtedly contributed to the Court's 1944 decision [to
abandon serious judicial scrutiny of rate regulation] in Hope, the dominant factor seems
to have been the Court's recognition of its institutional limitations." Pierce, supra note 87,
at 2046. On those limitations, see id. at 2045-46. But see Siegel II, supra note 5, at 258-59
(putting more emphasis on the changed composition of the Court and a resulting
"revolution in the conception of judicial method").
176. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 4, at 101-02 (observing that some of the old
Court's rate-evaluation principles continue to be used by modern agencies and courts).
177. Pierce, supra note 87, at 2051-52 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 2048-53.
Because he doubted their institutional capacity to address the problem, however, Pierce did
not recommend that the courts intervene to abort this process. See id.at 2053-70. Instead,
he placed his bet on federal legislation deregulating the electric utility industry. See id.
at 2071-75.
178. See id. at 2047-48.
179. 195 U.S. 223, 242 (1904).
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building of gasworks within a particular area after the beneficiary of the
first ordinance had begun construction. The Court overturned the
second ordinance not because a municipality could never reverse itself
in this way, but because there was no apparent justification for the
second ordinance and considerable evidence that the political influence
of a monopoly competitor lay behind it."s
The Substantive Due Process Decisions of Mr. Justice Holmes
So far, this Section of the Article has made three main contentions.
First, it simply is wrong to say that on some 200 occasions the Lochner
Court used substantive due process to invalidate economic regulations.
To make that claim even remotely plausible, moreover, we must include
the "peripheral" substantive due process cases within the total. But this
makes Lochner-era substantive due process much less noxious to liberal
sensibilities than if a smaller sample of old-Court substantive due
process cases were employed. Also supporting this third conclusion is
another fact that emerges from even the most superficial examination
of our 104 peripheral substantive due process cases. No less a supposed
foe of substantive due process than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes joined
most of them. Indeed, Holmes also joined in a significant number of our
fifty-five decisions at the core of Lochner-era substantive due process.
Holmes did not dissent in any of the eighteen incorporation cases, but
Furthermore,
nearly half of them occurred after he left the Court.'
he wrote two of the eighteen-his landmark decision in Pennsylvania
5 2 and a due process case that appears to incorpoCoal Co. v. Mahon"
rate Contract Clause reasoning."s However, he dissented much more
frequently-nine times specifically-from the thirty-two "peripheral"
But then
decisions among the old Court's due process tax cases.'
B.

180. See id. at 237-41.
181, For those cases, see supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
182. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
183, Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338, 338-42 (1922).
184. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Holmes's dissents took place in:
First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 331-34 (1932) (joining Justice Stone's dissent),

overruled by State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S.
582, 606-38 (1931) (joining Justice Roberts's dissent); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586,
595-96 (1930); Farmers' Loan &Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 216-18 (1930); Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 96-98 (1929); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle,

278 U.S. 460, 467-70 (1929) (joining Justice Brandeis's dissent); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 52-56
(1910); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 211 (1905).
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again, he wrote three of those decisions as well." Holmes also wrote
for the Court in one rate case and three regulation cases involving
And he dissented only six times in the fifty-four utility
utilities.'
decisions listed earlier.8 7
Thus, of the 104 decisions classified as peripheral substantive due
process cases, Holmes wrote nine, dissented in fifteen, and joined most
of the others. (Holmes served on the Court from 1902 until 1932, and
this Article's tally of substantive due process cases covers the years
1897-1937 inclusive.) Although this pattern does not repeat itself when
we turn to the "core" substantive due process decisions, Holmes did not
invariably dissent in these cases either. For example, he joined five and
wrote one of the six "utility" decisions classified as central to Lochner-era
substantive due process: those involving civil rights and remedies
against railroads.ss In addition, he joined all four of the real estate
decisions. 9 In the eleven tax cases treated as central to the old
Court's substantive due process, furthermore, Holmes joined in five and
Finally, Holmes wrote for the Court in two
dissented three times.'
of the cases classified as involving miscellaneous general regulaWithin this category, Holmes also joined two decisions while
tions.'
dissenting in two others.'9

185. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920); Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v.
O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904).
186. Brooks-Scanlon v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920); San Joaquin & Kings
River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454 (1914); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212
U.S. 132 (1909). On the utility rate and utility regulation cases, see supra notes 82-95 and
accompanying text.
187. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 100-24 (1931) (joining
Justice Stone's dissent); United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 255-88 (1930)
(joining Justice Brandeis's dissent); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 265
U.S. 403, 425 (1924); Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 437-46 (1919)
(joining Justice Clarke's dissent); City of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178,
195-98 (1918); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491, 502 (1915).
188. For these cases, see supra notes 89, 93 and accompanying text. Holmes wrote for
the Court in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914).
189. For these decisions, see supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
190. For these cases, see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. The dissents came
in Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 218-21 (1931); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S.
440, 446 (1928); and Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1926).
191. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 (1926); and St. Louis Cotton
Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922). However, I include these decisions among
the "core" group only because of their apparent relationship to Allgeyer v. Louisiana. See
supra note 124.
192. Holmes joined the majority in Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929), and New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918). He dissented in Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270
U.S. 402, 415-16 (1926), and Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517-34 (1924)
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The thirty-seven decisions involving employment, price regulations,

entry restrictions, and personal rights are among those that modern
commentators treat as representative of Lochner-era substantive due

process.19

Holmes dissented in fifteen of these cases."9

Although

the figure is a bit misleading, he joined the majority in nine others.195
Three of these decisions occurred after Holmes's departure from the
Court in 1932.
Perhaps, then, modern discussions of the old Court's substantive due
process decisions take their cue from Holmes (and, later, Brandeis and
Stone).' Another, perhaps more persuasive, explanation of why modern
commentators emphasize the cases they do is that many of those
decisions involve issues and constituencies on which liberals and
conservatives sharply differ. (The other "core" cases, on the other hand,
involve less politically charged matters.) But liberal politics cannot
explain Holmes's tendency to dissent in the old Court's high-profile
substantive due process decisions.'9 In fact, a question exists whether

(joining Justice Brandeis's dissent). See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
193. Compare supra notes 105-115, 119-59 with supra notes 13-28 and accompanying
text.
194. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1929); Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1928), overruled by North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359-75
(1928) (joining Justice Stone's dissent); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1,
11 (1927); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 447-54 (1927) (joining Justice Stone's
dissent); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 600-02 (1926);
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567-71 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-44 (1921); Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-616 (1917) (joining Justice Brandeis's dissent); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 642 (1914); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190-92 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76
(1905).
195. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500
(1926); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552 (1925); Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570
(1925); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). Holmes also concurred in Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530
(1925), but only because he felt himself bound byAdkins v. Children'sHospital. Thus, his
joining the Court in another minimum wage case, Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273
U.S. 657 (1927), no doubt was reluctant. Because Holmes dissented in Meyer v. Nebraska,
furthermore, stare decisis might also explain his vote in Pierce.
196. "His opposition [to substantive due process decisions based on liberty of contract]
did not imply any enthusiasm for the legislation it was being invoked to challenge. Holmes
repeatedly expressed skepticism about the efficacy of hours and wages legislation, child
labor reform, and other policy goals of'progressives.'" G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 320 (1993).
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any single factor differentiates the substantive due process cases he
wrote or joined from those which he dissented. For instance, Holmes's
dissents were not confined to substantive due process cases in which
freedom of contract was explicitly made the protected right. Contrary
to popular belief, those cases were not especially numerous.'97 Worse
yet, Holmes joined at least two of these freedom-of-contract cases. 1'
Nor were Holmes's dissents confined to cases when liberty, rather than
property, received substantive due process protection.'

197. In its substantive due process decisions, the old Court did not always bother to
identify the exact property right or liberty implicated in the case. The cases involving
property or some liberty other than freedom of contract, however, almost certainly
outnumbered those involving freedom of contract. In fact, I estimate that of the 55
substantive due process decisions, only 11 clearly involved freedom of contract. They are:
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (right to contract for insurance outside of
state); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 56 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 172 (1908) (apparently deriving freedom of contract from both liberty and property);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357,
377 (1918); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923), overruled by West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations,
262 U.S. 522, 533 (1923); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S.
552, 561-69 (1925) (because it applied the Court's holding in the first Chas. Wolff case);
Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (which followed Adkins); Donham v. Nelson Mfg.
Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (which also followed Adkins); Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610 (1936). Because they mainly involve utility rates, utility
regulation, taxation, and incorporation, whether many of my "peripheral" substantive due
process cases involved freedom of contract is doubtful.
However, some Lochner-era substantive due process cases arguably involved freedom of
contract in substance even if they formally invoked some other liberty or property right.
For example, if the bundle of rights comprising property ownership includes the right to
freely alienate the property on one's own terms, then property includes freedom of contract.
See, e.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429 (1927) (right of owner to fix price for
sale of property is an attribute of that property); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74
(1917) (property includes rights to acquire, use, and dispose of it).
198. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 533 (1923);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357,377 (1918). In addition, Holmes joined two
later applications of the first Chas. Wolff case, and each case arguably was based on
freedom of contract. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-90 (1924) and Chas. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552 (1925). As we saw supra in note
195, moreover, Holmes joined two minimum wage cases that probably were based on
freedom of contract, but only because he felt himself bound by stare decisis.
199. For example, Holmes dissented in the following cases, each of which apparently
found that the claimant had been deprived of property without due process: Hoeper v. Tax
Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 214-16, 218-21 (1931); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235,
239, 245 (1929); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-13, 114-15 (1928),
overruled by North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S.
156 (1973); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429, 445-47 (1927); Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 589, 600-02 (1926); Schlesinger v.
Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 238, 241-42 (1926); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 322, 327,
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C. Three Standard Criticisms of the Lochner Court
As G. Edward White observed in a recent article, commentators have
tended to ignore the extent that Holmes "joined Taft, VanDevanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler in extending and refining the
categories of orthodox early-twentieth century jurisprudence."2' The
previous discussion is consistent with this claim. That discussion also
casts some doubt on certain other accepted views about the Lochner era.
This Article's Introduction noted three standard criticisms of Lochner-era
substantive due process, each affected by the frequency with which
government action fell before the doctrine. These were: (1) that the
judicial activism permitted by substantive due process offends democratic values, (2) that the Lochner Court's substantive due process decisions
furthered business interests, and (3) that they were intended to do
SO.2"1 In light of the previous discussion, what can we say about these
three criticisms?
1. Lochner-era Substantive Due Process and Democratic
Values. A constitutional doctrine's susceptibility to the charge that it
is antidemocratic, one would think, is a matter of degree. Among other
things, the charge's validity depends on the number of times the doctrine
is used to overcome legislative enactments. If we limit ourselves to the
cases that were central to Lochner-era substantive due process, the old
Court invalidated state or federal laws some fifty-odd times over a forty
year period. This amounts to slightly over one such episode per year.
Of course, the impact of one strategic Supreme Court decision can be
immense. The federal courts and the states may follow it innumerable
times, and the decision may also deter legislatures from enacting certain
kinds of statutes. In assessing the impact of Lochner-era substantive
due process, moreover, it would be most useful to know how many laws
survived when challenged on that basis." 2 For these reasons, the
number of "kills" attributable to substantive due process is an imperfect
measure of its impact. But it hardly is useless information either. And,
fifty or so kills are far fewer than the official estimate of 200.
Of course, if we include the "peripheral" decisions in the total,
Lochner-era substantive due process claimed almost 160 victims.

328, 342-44 (1921).

200. G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and
JudicialReputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 578 (1995) (speaking also of Brandeis).
201. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.

202. See supra note 12 (describing two early Twentieth Century studies that did
attempt such an analysis, but that did not cover the entire Lochner era).
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Primarily because the standards they apply usually derive from other
constitutional provisions, however, a question remains whether these
cases should be treated as substantive due process decisions at all.
Whatever the proper categorization of these cases, moreover, many of
them have significant justifications. In this connection, perhaps it
suffices to say that no less an advocate of judicial restraint than Holmes
signed on to most of the "peripheral" decisions.
2. The Pro-Business Consequences of Lochner-era Substantive
Due Process. Within the list of cases contemporary commentators
regard as typifyingLochner-era substantive due process, the employment
cases are well represented. These cases are commonly regarded as
increasing business power over working people by striking down laws
intended to protect them from that power.' 3 If, as the standard
sources seem to suggest, old-time substantive due process worked some
200 times, and if these cases resemble those the sources discuss, the
doctrine's pro-business consequences would have been impressive indeed.
But as we now know, Lochner-erasubstantive due process did not inflict
200 casualties. Still, many of the peripheral and core substantive due
process cases obviously benefitted business. This is true of all or
virtually all the utility rate and utility regulation decisions.'
Some
of the various due process tax cases probably enabled businesses or
wealthy individuals to avoid tax liability.205

The incorporation cases

involving the Contract and Takings Clauses probably aided business
interests as well. 206 Turning to core substantive due process decisions,
the employment, price regulation, and general economic regulation cases
all seemed to tangibly assist some business firms. 7
Thus, the claim that Lochner-era substantive due process benefitted
business seems justified by the cases discussed here. Whether it
unjustifiably benefitted business is another question. Many of the
decisions just discussed arguably had important justifications. For
example, the utility rate and utility regulation cases involved asserted
malfunctions of democratic governance, 0 8 and many of the due process
tax cases presented questions of interstate power relations.2 9 In other
cases, the motives underlying the challenged legislation may not have
been what they seemed. This is especially true of the cases involving

203.

See supra note 9.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

82-95 and accompanying text.
72-81 and accompanying text.
64-67, 69-70 and accompanying text.
105-08, 119-54 and accompanying text.
170-78 and accompanying text.
76-77 and accompanying text.
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minimum-wage and maximum-hours legislation, which possibly reflected
the interests of male dominated unions and business competitors,
respectively.2 1 °
3. The Question of Motive. The immediately preceding remarks
go some way toward undermining the last suggested criticism of
Lochner-era substantive due process: that it was primarily motivated by
the desire to advance business interests. Another reason for questioning
this view about the old Court is that some of its substantive due process
decisions did not visibly assist business. This is true of some of its
incorporation decisions, its land-use cases, its three "personal rights"
Indeed, the entry restriction
cases, and its entry restriction cases.2
cases can be regarded as antibusiness,or at least as hostile to established economic interests that use state power to suppress competition.2' 2 The simplest and most general explanation for the old Court's
substantive due process decisions is that most of its Justices were
exactly what they seemed and claimed to be: exponents of personal
freedom and limited government.2'3
V.

CONCLUSION

Standard accounts of Lochner-era substantive due process tend to
focus on the same twenty or so high profile cases. They also seem to say
that the old Court struck down approximately 200 laws on substantive
due process grounds. In the process, they implicitly suggest that the

210. See, e.g., SIEGAN, supra note 5, at 148-49 (suggesting that minimum wage laws for
women were motivated in part by male workers' and male-dominated unions' desire to
suppress the competition created by female workers). See also id. at 115-18 (suggesting
that the law struck down in Lochner would have tended to give larger bakeries an edge
over smaller ones). But see KENS, supra note 5, ch. 5 (not mentioning these influences
while discussing the New York legislature's passage of the law at issue in Lochner).
211. See supra notes 68, 96-103, 109-17, 155-59 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Phillips II, supra note 5, at 407-17, 438-47 and the sources cited there.
213. Another possibility, whose merits and relationship to my own interpretation I
cannot consider here, is that the old Court was less devoted to laissez-faire than to an ideal
of neutral government that proscribed "class legislation"--legislation benefitting particular
economic interests (often at the expense of competitors) and not the general interest. This
view is developed at considerable length in GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 7-11, 20-21, 61-62,
114, 199. See id. ch. 3-4 for his interpretations of several important Lochner-era
substantive due process decisions. Although they would seem to support his thesis,
however, Gillman does not emphasize the old Court's entry restriction cases. Perhaps this
is because they are inconsistent with his belief that Lochner-era neutrality became
incongruous in an age when corporate power created conditions of economic dependency
requiring corrective social legislation. See, e.g., id. at 76-86, 114-18, 147-58. But entry
restrictions are not laws of this kind; if anything, they reflect superior corporate power.
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approximately 180 cases they do not discuss resemble the ones they
specifically examine. In reality, of course, the Lochner Court claimed
nowhere near 200 substantive due process victims. In fact, only by
greatly stretching the definition of substantive due process does the
figure reach 160. Under a more restricted conception of the term, the
Supreme Court invalidated slightly over fifty laws on substantive due
process grounds during the Lochner era.
These findings create a significant problem for foes of the old Court.
If these people define substantive due process with any rigor, they are
left with relatively few cases to criticize. But if they broaden the
definition of that term, they are forced to include many decisions joined
by such supposed enemies of substantive due process as Holmes, as well
as a few cases almost no one would reject today. This broader notion of
Lochner-era substantive due process renders it much more of a
mainstream doctrine than is generally realized. The idea that economic
regulations are subject to some form of substantive due process review
commanded assent from all the Court's members for some forty years;
even Holmes did not have a principled objection to substantive due
process as such.214 And if Holmes could stomach some substantive due
process review of economic regulations, why should today's Court refuse
to do the same?

214. See supra notes 181-99 and accompanying text. In addition, several of Holmes's
famed dissents clearly accept some kind of substantive due process review, however
minimal. See, e.g., Louis v. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1928) (state
entry restriction for pharmacy business is constitutional because it has some tendency to
promote safer operation of such businesses), overruled by North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525, 567-68 (1923) (apparent test for validity of minimum wage law for women
is whether reasonable man could believe that it is needed to protect women against certain
evils), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1915) (apparent test for validity of challenged law is whether a
reasonable man could believe that it enables workers to bargain freely and get a fair deal);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (liberty perverted when held to prevent the
triumph of a dominant opinion, unless the challenged law would infringe on fundamental
principles as understood by our traditions and our law). See also BORK, supra note 7, at
45-46 (decrying Holmes's acceptance of substantive due process in Lochner); WHITE, supra
note 196, at 323-24 (discussing Holmes's first statement of his approach to substantive due
process in Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1902)).

